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THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND THE MOVEMENT FOR 
BLACK LIVES 
Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb* 
Abstract 
This Article discusses how faculty can substantively address white 
supremacy in the law school curriculum as part of the Movement for 
Black Lives. Because legal education sets how law students are taught to 
think about public policy and racial justice in the legal system, law 
schools’ failure to educate students critically about white supremacy in 
the core law school curriculum makes them active participants in the legal 
system’s devaluation of Black lives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Do Black Lives Matter in the law school curriculum? What would it 
look like if they did? The killings of Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, 
and George Floyd brought with them protests, police response, and 
political maneuverings as White Americans were forced to grapple with 
their own fragility1 and the fragility of Black lives. Black lives–students, 
staff, faculty, and administrative–remain fragile in U.S. law schools 
where their presence is used as evidence of racial progress even as 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Chicago Law School. The author thanks God, 
whose blessings are too numerous to count, and her husband, Mark Anthony Chubb, who 
reaffirms that their Black Lives Matter every day. 
 1. ROBIN D’ANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO TALK 
ABOUT RACISM (2018).  
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institutional commitments to Black lives stall beyond simple 
representation.2 Like most academic institutions, law schools look to the 
superficial recruitment of Black students and faculty, and hire Black 
administrative staff, while turning a blind eye to the substantive work of 
providing inclusive environments that support its Black lives 
academically through graduation;3 during the tenure and promotion 
processes; and through mentorship and sponsorship,4 wage equity, and 
transparent hiring practices. As law schools re-open in the midst of a 
global health pandemic, we must face the pandemic of white supremacy 
that pervades all levels of law school operations. Black lives in law school 
are neither fungible and interchangeable, nor valuable only to prove an 
institution’s commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) efforts. 
Rather, law schools must examine how the manner in which they train 
law students for law practice either serves or undermines the cause of 
justice.  
I.  RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES 
Asserting that Black lives matter in law school is a controversial 
proposition that draws ambiguous affirmation. When Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor authored her opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,5 she revealed how 
law schools view Black lives in the context of legal education and who 
benefits from their presence.6 In examining whether the University of 
Michigan Law School’s affirmative action admissions policy passed 
Constitutional muster, she wrote:  
[T]he Law School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-
racial understanding,” helps to break down racial 
stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better understand 
persons of different races.” These benefits are “important 
and laudable,” because “classroom discussion is livelier, 
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” 
when the students have “the greatest possible variety of 
backgrounds.”  
 
 2. Aaron N. Taylor, The Marginalization of Black Aspiring Lawyers, 13 FIU L. REV. 489, 
505–11 (2019). 
 3. Id. at 510. 
 4. Id.; Sponsorship differs from mentorship, in that a mentor acts as a senior advisor 
because they have “walked” the way their mentees wish to walk. A sponsor acts as an advocate 
within their sponsee’s institution or field to advocate for their interests and advancement. For 
more on sponsorship see Robin C. Hilsabeck, Comparing Mentorship and Sponsorship in Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 32:2 THE CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST 284 (2018); Manasa Ayyala et al., 
Mentorship Is Not Enough: Exploring Sponsorship and Its Role in Career Advancement in 
Academic Medicine, 94:1 ACAD. MED. 94 (2019).  
 5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 6. Id. at 330–31. 
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The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is 
further bolstered by its amici, who point to the educational 
benefits that flow from student body diversity. In addition to 
the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, 
numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes 
learning outcomes, and “better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better 
prepares them as professionals.”7 
These “benefits” have not necessarily accrued to Black students. 
Rather, they make Black students’ acceptable presence in law school 
contingent on their ability to promote cross-racial understanding, break 
down stereotypes, and contribute enlightenment and interest to the 
classroom conversation. Black law students are placed in a position to 
continually prove that they deserve a place in their law school classes, 
while White students are presumed to belong there. These are the hidden 
assumptions on which diversity in legal education rests. The benefits that 
Justice O’Connor wrote about are unidirectional—historically, law 
schools have not been overly concerned about what benefits, if any, Black 
students receive from their interactions with White students in law school 
classrooms, and have not pondered their commitment to Black student 
success.8  
DEI professionals have been in high demand to provide resources to 
help faculty address racial inequities and the macro and microaggressions 
that polarize their classrooms.9 However, DEI trainings alone are 
ineffective to address structural inequities in higher education and the 
professions.10 As a preliminary matter, any DEI training that does not 
differentiate between its White participants and participants of color to 
meet the separate needs of each is ineffective on its face. First, while 
every person of color is not an expert on race and gender issues, absent 
careful and considered study on the same, people of color do have 
personal experiences with White supremacy and patriarchy that are 
distinct from their White peers. Forcing people of color to sit through the 
same DEI training as their White colleagues ignores these experiences, 
and fails to acknowledge that trauma informed strategies are necessary to 
negotiate institutional relationships strained by racial macroaggressions,  
 
 7. Id. at 330.  
 8. Jessica C. Harris et al., Who Benefits?: A Critical Race Analysis of the (D) Evolving 
Language Of Inclusion in Higher Education, THOUGHT AND ACTION, Winter 2015, 
https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/84030/EquitySocialJustice.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/DJS5-GFRT]. 
 9. The perspectives that Professor McMurtry-Chubb offers here are based on her 
experience as a DEI consultant.  
 10. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity Training Work? 
The Challenge for Industry and Academia, 10:2 ANTHROPOLOGY NOW 48 (2018). 
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microaggressions, and racially discriminatory practices.11 Second, White 
DEI training participants are often resentful of required trainings and take 
that resentment out on their colleagues of color explicitly through macro 
and microaggressions.12 To the extent that these trainings center 
whiteness, primarily in attempts to minimize White resentment and soft-
pedal discussions of racial inequity, they act in obeisance to white 
supremacy. Third, without a change in campus culture or an 
administration willing to make deep substantive changes to every area of 
law school operations, these trainings are but one drop in an ocean of 
discriminatory, harmful attitudes and practices. Unless critical 
interventions are introduced into legal education, it is unlikely that 
lawyers will cease to replicate inequities in the way they conceptualize, 
frame, interpret, and apply the law.13  
II.  THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES IN THE CLASSROOM 
The foundational pedagogy for any inclusive and equitable classroom 
should be one that focuses on the relationship between professor and 
student.14 This point may seem obvious, but it is paramount when 
considering faculty requests to “receive training on how to facilitate 
difficult conversations in the classroom.”15 On the surface, this request 
seems reasonable. However, it is a request that actually reinforces racial 
hierarchies in relationships between Black professors and their peers and 
Black professors and their students. Black professors and their non-White 
counterparts do not necessarily have the option of avoiding issues of 
privilege and power when they enter a classroom setting. On the contrary, 
students often see their ability to teach them (or not) through the lenses 
 
11 See, e.g., William Ming Liu, rossina Zamora Liu, Yunkyoung Loh Garrison, et. al., Racial 
Trauma, Microaggressions, and Becoming Racially Innocuous: The Role of Acculturation and 
White Supremacist Ideology, 74 American Psychologist 1 (2019); Thema Bryant-Davis, 
Microaggressions: Considering the Framework of Psychological Trauma in Microaggression 
Theory: Influence and Interpretation 86-101 (2018) 
 12. See, e.g., Michael Mobley & Tamara Payne, Backlash! The Challenge to Diversity 
Training, 46:12 TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT 45 (1992).  
 13. See, e.g., Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, The Practical Implications of Unexamined 
Assumptions: Disrupting Flawed Legal Arguments to Advance the Cause of Justice, 58 
WASHBURN L.J. 531 (2019) (detailing the results of a six-year empirical research study that 
showed how student attitudes about race, class, gender, and sexuality impacted their ability to 
formulate viable legal arguments).  
 14. Sean Darling-Hammond and Kristen Holmquist, Creating Wise Classrooms to 
Empower Diverse Law Students: Lessons in Pedagogy from Transformative Law Professors, 25 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 1, 9, 17–19 (2015) (describing methods law professors use to create 
inclusive classrooms where all students can succeed). 
 15. John D. Vogelsang & Sophia McGee, Handbook for Facilitating Difficult 
Conversations in the Classroom (2015), http://teach.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ 
Handbook-for-Facilitating-Difficult-Conversations2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9GZ-TJSA] (an 
example of a guidebook used to facilitate difficult classroom discussions). 
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of White supremacy and patriarchy.16 Accordingly, most professors of 
color do not have the option of avoiding discussions about privilege and 
power—they are part and parcel of our experience as educators. Yet, 
throughout our teaching careers, we are placed in environments where 
our institutions do not recognize this emotional and psychological labor, 
another dimension of our daily work. Our career success requires that we 
learn how to facilitate these discussions alone, without any recognition, 
support, or training by our institutions, or resources for dealing with our 
own oppression inflicted trauma.17  
A significant component in creating the best classroom environment 
is developing meaningful relationships with students.18 This means 
understanding who our students are, meeting them where they are, and 
being clear with ourselves about how much of ourselves we wish to reveal 
in the education process. Ultimately, the best way to learn how to have 
difficult conversations in the classroom is to have difficult conversations 
in the classroom—but with support. Educating educators about 
appropriate language, key terms, and the foundational tenets for 
discussing privilege and power is an important first step, but it cannot be 
the only step. We must create inclusive classroom environments through 




 16. See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors’ Lives: The Bell-
Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 349, 359–61 (1989); Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, 
Writing at the Master’s Table: Reflections on Theft, Criminality, and Otherness in the Legal 
Writing Profession, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 43, 45–46, 49–50 (2009); Lorraine Bannai, Challenged 
X 3: The Stories of Women of Color Who Teach Legal Writing, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. JUST. 
275, 279–81 (2014); MEERA E. DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE AND GENDER IN LEGAL 
ACADEMIA (2019); Nantiya Ruan, Papercuts: Hierarchical Microaggressions in Law Schools, 31 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 3, 4, 13 (2019).   
 17. Anahvia Moody & Jioni Lewis, Gendered Racial Microaggressions and Traumatic 
Stress Symptoms Among Black Women, 43 Psychology of Women Quarterly 2 (2019); Monnica 
T. Williams, Destiny M.B. Printz & Ryan C.T. DeLapp, Assessing Racial Trauma with the 





 18. See Why Strong Teacher Relationships Lead to Student Engagement and a Better 
School Environment, WATERFORD.ORG (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.waterford.org/education/ 
teacher-student-relationships/.  
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A.  Teaching the Movement for Black Lives in Criminal Law: 
Grappling with Goetz 
The core legal curricular canon is dense with cases that reiterate to 
students that Black lives do not matter. People v. Goetz,19 which details 
Bernard Goetz’s shooting of four unarmed young Black men on a New 
York City subway, is one such case.20 It evokes strong feelings when 
taught, and is either memorable to Black law students for how their 
professor mishandled the classroom discussion by failing to address its 
racial dynamics, or meaningful because of how their professor embraced 
a rich discussion on how white supremacy shapes legal definitions of 
reasonableness in the context of self-defense.21  
The events that lead Bernard Goetz to shoot Troy Canty (age 19), 
Darryl Cabey (age 19), James Ramseur (age 18), and Barry Allen (age 
19) transpired on Saturday, December 22, 1984, on an IRT express train 
from the Bronx to lower Manhattan.22 On that day, the four young men 
approached Goetz on the train.23 James and Daryll had screwdrivers 
inside of their coats, which they had previously used to extract coins from 
video game machines.24 Goetz boarded the train and sat down in the rear 
section of the same car the young men occupied.25 He was carrying an 
unlicensed .38 tucked in a waistband holster and had loaded the gun with 
five rounds of ammunition.26  
Troy and Barry approached Goetz, and Troy said to him “give me five 
dollars.”27 None of the young men, including Troy and Barry, had any 
visible weapons.28 At the time Troy spoke to Goetz, Goetz stood and fired 
four shots—each right after the other.29 Shot one hit Troy in the chest.30 
Shot two hit Barry in the back.31 The third shot went through James’ arm 
and into his left side.32 Goetz fired the fourth shot at Darryl, but missed 
him.33 After regarding the young men he had wounded, Goetz then shot 
 
 19. 497 N.E.2d. 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
 20. Id. at 43.  
 21. Leslie P. Culver, White Doors, Black Footsteps: Leveraging "White Privilege” to 
Benefit Law Students of Color, 21 JOURNAL OF GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 37, 79–80 (2017). 
 22. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43.  
 27. Id. (citation omitted). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43. 
 33. Id. 
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a fifth bullet at Darryl.34 It entered the rear of Darryl’s side and severed 
his spinal cord.35 When the conductor came into the car afterward, Goetz 
told him that Troy, Darryl, James, and Barry had tried to rob him.36  
Bernard Goetz fled the subway car where the shooting occurred, and 
then left the state for Concord, New Hampshire where he spent the 
holiday.37 Nine days later, on December 31,1984, he surrendered to the 
police in Concord after identifying himself as the New York subway 
shooter.38 He later told the police that in shooting the young men he 
wanted to “murder [them], to hurt them, to make them suffer as much as 
possible.”39 Goetz also told the police that before shooting Darryl Cabey 
with the shot that severed his spinal cord he said “you seem to be all right, 
here’s another.”40 Lastly, Goetz told police that “if [he] had . . . more 
bullets, [he] would have shot them again. . . .”41  
Upon his return to New York City, Goetz was arraigned on a charge 
of attempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon.42 The first 
grand jury only indicted Goetz on a charge of one count of criminal 
possession of a weapon in the third degree for the gun he used to shoot 
Troy, Darryl, James, and Barry.43 The grand jury also indicted Goetz on 
a charge of two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth 
degree for guns found in his apartment.44 Neither Goetz nor any of the 
young men testified, although the jury did hear Goetz’s statements to the 
police.45 The first grand jury issued no indictment on the attempted 
murder charge.46  
The second grand jury indicted Goetz on four charges of attempted 
murder, four charges of assault, one charge of reckless endangerment, 
and one charge of criminal possession of a weapon.47 Troy and James 
testified before the second grand jury, and again the jury heard Goetz’s 
statements to the police.48 In his presentation to the second grand jury, 
the prosecutor instructed the jury that in their consideration of whether 
Goetz could avail himself of the justification of self-defense, the jury had 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (citation omitted). 
 40. Id. (citation omitted). 
 41. Id. (citation omitted). 
 42. Id.  
 43. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44.  
 44. Id. at 44–45. 
 45. Id. at 44.  
 46. Id. at 45. 
 47. Id. at 45.  
 48. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 45. 
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to determine if “Goetz’s conduct was that of a ‘reasonable man in 
[Goetz’s] situation.’”49  
Goetz moved to dismiss the charges in the second indictment on 
several grounds, including grounds that the prosecutor’s jury instructions 
with respect to self-defense were incorrect.50 The trial court agreed, 
reasoning that the standard was not objective as the prosecutor instructed, 
but “wholly subjective, focusing entirely on the defendant’s state of mind 
when he used such force.”51 The Appellate Division affirmed the 
decision, but gave the state of New York leave to appeal.52  
The Appellate Court framed the issue as whether the use of deadly 
force as self-defense is justified under a subjective standard, which 
focuses on the defendant’s state of mind.53 It found that the standard for 
self-defense is both objective and subjective, meaning that the finder of 
fact must determine if the actions were reasonable to the defendant and 
reasonable under the circumstances.54 In the court’s words: 
[T]he [l]egislature [did not intend] . . . to allow the 
perpetrator of a serious crime to go free simply because that 
person believed his actions were reasonable and necessary 
to prevent some perceived harm. To completely exonerate 
such an individual, no matter how aberrational or bizarre his 
thought patterns, would allow citizens to set their own 
standards for the permissible use of force. It would also 
allow a legally competent defendant suffering from 
delusions to kill or perform acts of violence with impunity, 
contrary to fundamental principles of justice and criminal 
law.55 
Goetz claimed that he perceived that Troy, Darryl, James, and Barry 
were a threat to him because when Canty asked him “how are you,” 
moved close to him and smiled, Goetz “knew from the smile on Troy’s 
face that he wanted to ‘play with [him].’”56 His perception was also 
informed by being mugged on two prior occasions, even though he 
confirmed that none of the young men possessed a gun.57 In essence, the 
court’s ruling allowed the jury at Goetz’s trial to decide whether Goetz’s 
belief that four unarmed young Black men were dangerous was 
reasonable to him, based on his previous experiences with violence. The 
 
 49. Id. at 46.  
 50. Id. at 45.  
 51. Id. at 46.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 49–50.  
 55. Id. at 50.  
 56. Id. at 44.  
 57. Id. 
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court also required the jurors to examine whether Goetz’s act of firing a 
gun, in an enclosed subway car at four unarmed young Black men, was 
reasonable under the circumstances.58 Although on its face, the court’s 
clarification of the self-defense standard attempts to do justice, it in no 
way considers that the “circumstances” under which a jury would 
evaluate the objective reasonableness of Goetz’s actions normalizes 
young Black men as dangerous. In a society infused with white 
supremacy, such perceptions are not “aberrational,” “bizarre” or 
“delusional” even though they undermine the cause of justice.  
To set the stage for a classroom discussion that seeks to reveal white 
supremacy in determinations of reasonableness in the use of deadly force 
against Black people, a professor can contextualize stereotypes about 
Black men legally and historically when they assign the Goetz case. Short 
articles, such as the blog post Antebellum Law is the Precedent for 
Today’s White-on-Black Violence59 about the killing of Ahmaud Arbery 
or Patrisse Cullors’ op-ed On Trayvon Martin’s birthday we remember 
his life and why we fight for black lives60 are short, easy reads that provide 
an alternate lens through which students will read the text of the legal 
opinion. During the classroom discussion, the professor can show clips 
of the news footage from the day of the shooting and subsequent 
interviews with Goetz years later, which are widely available online. The 
interview clips in particular show how Goetz viewed his actions. For 
example, in an interview with Dateline NBC twelve years after the 
shooting, Goetz remarked “society is better off without certain people, 
whether one believes they should be killed or locked up or used for forced 
slavery. It’s just a matter of one’s political point of view.”61  
Lastly, questions to guide the classroom discussion might include:  
 
1. Is the reasonable person standard a race and gender-
neutral standard?62 
 
 58. Id. at 52. 
 59. Elizabeth Berenguer, Lucy Jewel, & Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Antebellum Law is the 
Precedent for Today’s White-On-Black Violence, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: RACE AND 
THE L. PROF BLOG (June 13, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/racelawprof/2020/06/ 
antebellum-law-is-the-precedent-for-todays-white-on-black-violence-by-professors-elizabeth-
berenguer.html [https://perma.cc/55KT-LG4X].  
 60. Patrisse Cullors, On Trayvon Martin’s Birthday, We Remember His Life and Why We 
Fight for Black Lives, Think, NBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2018, 12:54 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
think/opinion/trayvon-martin-s-birthday-we-remember-his-life-why-we-ncna844711 [https:// 
perma.cc/YDN4-USKG].  
 61. Stone Phillips, Interview with Bernard Goetz, YOUTUBE (Feb. 16, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVkUytZCzJ8 [https://perma.cc/U7ES-858M] (originally 
on Dateline NBC). 
 62. Note: I include gender, because I want students to get the connection between white 
supremacy and patriarchy as applied in discriminatory ways to Black men. For more on the 
tortured white supremacist, patriarchal and capitalist history of the reasonable person standard, 
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2. If not, in what ways does the court infuse it with racial and 
gendered meanings?  
 
3. Given the readings and videos that you have watched, 
what are some ways that the court could have included the history 
of informal policing in its determination of whether Goetz acted 
reasonably under the circumstances?  
 
4. Would including this history have led to a just and 
equitable result?  
 
5. If Goetz had been a Black man, who shot four White 
young men under the same circumstances, would the court have 
reached a similar result? Explain your answer.  
 
By modeling critical reading of the reasonable person standard in a 
criminal law class, a professor can shape how a student both understands 
this concept in their other classes and utilizes critical reading methods as 
they study cases throughout law school.  
III.  THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES IN LEGAL REASONING 
Legal reasoning is a skill that law professors teach across the 
curriculum. Yet, we do not problematize the fact that legal reasoning is 
imbedded in Western rhetorical and reasoning forms.63 In this way, law 
schools indoctrinate students in the very forms of reasoning that replicate 
privilege and power.64 In order to educate students in a manner that helps 
them critique how reasoning frameworks impact legal outcomes and 
thwart lawyers’ best intentions to ”do” justice, we must disrupt this 
indoctrination. When this disruption occurs early in a law student’s 
career, it can impact that law student’s level of critical thinking in all of 
their law school classes.  
Law and legal language are unique in that they instantiate racial and 
power relations by privileging Western rhetorical and reasoning forms—
especially logos or logical reasoning.65 In the practical, day-to-day work 
of teaching and learning, legal language excludes non-Western 
epistemologies (ways of knowing) and ontologies (ways of being) by 
forcing conformity through traditional legal process methods disguised 
 
see Lucy Jewel, Does the Reasonable Man Have Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, 54 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1049 (2019).   
 63. See generally Elizabeth Berenguer, Lucille Jewell & Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Gut 
Renovations: Using Critical and Comparative Rhetoric to Remodel How the Law Addresses 
Privilege and Power, 23 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 205 (2020).  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
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as neutral and universal. In re-thinking our courses, we must work to 
reframe them in a manner that lays bare the work of white supremacy and 
exposes how it is a direct threat to effecting justice in Black lives.  
A.  Integrating the Movement for Black Lives into Civil Procedure66: 
Re-Framing Iqbal & Twombly 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal67 and Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly68 are 
foundational to law students’ understanding of how to draft complaints. 
Iqbal reaffirms that legal conclusions in a complaint are not presumed to 
be true.69 Twombly requires a complaint to contain sufficient factual 
allegations to “state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.”70 
These cases and the rules that they establish are usually taught as non-
controversial, straightforward “rules” with no racial dynamic. The case 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catastrophe 
Management Solutions, Inc.71 is illustrative of how the rules for drafting 
pleadings are centered in Western reasoning structures that center logos 
and seek to obscure how white supremacy colors legal interpretation and 
analysis. 
Chastity Jones applied for a job with Catastrophe Management 
Solutions, Inc. (CMS).72 At the time of her interview, she was wearing 
her hair in “locs,”73 or a hairstyle characterized by solid pieces of grouped 
hairs that are various sizes in width and diameter. CMS offered her the 
job, but subsequently required that Ms. Jones cut off her locs as a 
condition of her employment.74 CMS cited its company grooming policy, 
which stated in relevant part that “[a]ll personnel are expected to be 
dressed and groomed in a manner that projects a professional and 
businesslike image while adhering to company and industry standards 
and/or guidelines. . . . [H]airstyle should reflect a business/professional 
image. No excessive hairstyles or unusual colors are acceptable[.]”75 
When Ms. Jones refused to cut off her locs, CMS rescinded its offer.76 In 
 
 66. For scholarship that approaches civil procedure critically, see, e.g., Suzette Malveaux, 
A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its 
Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH U. L. REV. 455 (2014). The focus of this part of this 
Article is to give professors one curricular example of how to critically reframe a key concept in 
a civil procedure course.  
 67. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
 68. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
 69. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.  
 70. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  
 71. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 72. Id. at 1021. 
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 74. Id. at 1021–22. 
 75. Id. at 1022 (emphasis added). 
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calling her hair “dreadlocks,” literally dreaded (undesirable) hair, CMS 
placed it in the category of unprofessional and non-businesslike, 
excessive and beyond the scope of its acceptable grooming practices.  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a 
complaint on behalf of Ms. Jones, alleging that CMS’ actions violated 
Title VII’s prohibitions on race discrimination.77 CMS moved to dismiss 
the EEOC’s complaint, alleging that it failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.78 Citing Iqbal and Twombly, CMS argued that 
“[the EEOC’s] complaint lacks both the foundation of a legally viable 
claim for relief and the factual basis to create even an inference of 
intentional discrimination. Specifically, [CMS] maintains as its sole 
contention that a dreadlock hairstyle is not an immutable characteristic, 
one which indicates race. Therefore, [CMS’] policy of prohibiting such 
hairstyles is not actionable under Title VII.”79  
Four averments in the EEOC’s complaint illustrate how white 
supremacy informs what is a legal conclusion and what is a sufficient 
factual allegation. The EEOC plead:  
[1] [R]ace “is a social construct and has no biological 
definition.”  
[2] “[T]he concept of race is not limited to or defined by 
immutable physical characteristics.”  
[3] [T]he “concept of race encompasses cultural 
characteristics related to race or ethnicity,” including 
“grooming practices.”  
[4] [A]lthough some non-black persons “have a hair texture 
that would allow the hair to lock, dreadlocks are nonetheless 
a racial characteristic, just as skin color is a racial 
characteristic.”80  
Although the EEOC later moved to amend its complaint, it maintained 
that its initial complaint met the pleading standards outlined in Iqbal and 
Twombly. It argued:  
[The] amended complaint outlines the historical relations 
between Blacks and Whites in the United States [and] 
includes an ugly history of degradation of, and 
discrimination against, Blacks because of the unique texture 
of their natural hair dating back to the introduction of slavery 
 
 77. EEOC, 852 F.3d at 1020.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant Catastrophe Management Solutions’ 
Motion to Dismiss, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions Inc., 852 F.3d 1018 (2016), 2014 WL 
4745282, at *1.  
 80. EEOC, 852 F.3d at 1022 (reformatted for clarity).  
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in the United States. And, the proposed Amended Complaint 
goes on to allege due to the larger society’s normative 
standards and expectations that Blacks wear their hair in a 
manner similar to whites, i.e. straightened, Defendant’s 
application of the policy with the ban on [locs] is 
discriminatory. Finally, the amended complaint spells out 
that [n]on-Blacks were not subjected to this broad-brush in 
the implementation of the Defendant’s grooming policy—
i.e., that the manner in which they manage the natural 
construct of their hair, regardless of the style in which they 
wear it, prohibits their employ. Thus, neutralizing the court’s 
argument that [loc’d] hair is not unique to African 
Americans and that it is beyond the cavil of Title VII.81 
Nevertheless, the court granted CMS’s Motion to Dismiss, reasoning 
that based on the allegations in the EEOC complaint, it could not 
“identify each of the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery 
under some viable legal theory.”82  
The court’s reasoning illuminates how white supremacy cannot hold 
space for any racial knowledge that does not place it at the center. Within 
its Western reasoning paradigms,83 a hairstyle is just a hairstyle, devoid 
of cultural meaning or culturally specific grooming practices that best suit 
its texture. Reframing the pleading rules in the context of white 
supremacy leads students to question their presentation as neutral, and to 
understand how legal interpretation is not devoid of value judgments 
based on misunderstandings about race and gender.  
IV.  BEYOND REPRESENTATION IN THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES 
Sixteen years after Grutter, in 2019, the ABA reported that only 15% 
of lawyers in the United States are racial and ethnic minorities.84 The 
statistics for law professors are equally abysmal. As of 2009, the last year 
for which the Association of American Law Schools published such data, 
of the approximately 10,965 law professors in the United States, 409 law 
professors were Black women (3.73%) and 344 (3.14%) were Black 
men.85 Even among these professors you would be hard pressed to find 
graduates outside of T-14 schools or law schools in the top fourteen of 
 
 81. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, EEOC v. 
Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions Inc., 852 F.3d 1018 (2016), 2014 WL 4745295, at *4. 
 82. Id. at 2.  
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the U.S. News and World Report rankings.86 For example, much is made 
of the increasing number of Black women law deans over the last three 
years. However, of their number (twenty-four), only nine (37.5%) did not 
graduate from a law school ranked in the T-14.87 This is not to diminish 
the accomplishments of any of these law deans’, which are extraordinary, 
but to give law schools pause when considering faculty and 
administrative hiring as a significant DEI effort.  
CONCLUSION 
Representation is important—if you cannot see yourself in your 
teachers, professors, and lawyers, then it is hard to believe that you can 
aspire to be them one day. But representation is not representation when 
lawyers and law professors of color are recruited who conform to 
normative standards that center white supremacist, patriarchal, and 
 
 86. See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, A Place in the Academy: Law Faculty Hiring and 
Socioeconomic Bias, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 171, 178–79 (2013); Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and 
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Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1206–07 (2008). 
 87. The following law deans have been hired over the last three years at their respective 
institutions; where they attended law school is noted in parentheses after their name: 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Boston University (University of Michigan Law School) 
Kimberly Mutcherson, Rutgers-Camden (Columbia Law School) 
Song Richardson, UC Irvine (Yale Law School) 
Tamara Lawson, St. Thomas-Miami (University of San Francisco School of Law) 
Michèle Alexandre, Stetson (Harvard Law School) 
Marcilynn A. Burke, University of Oregon (Yale Law School) 
Danielle M. Conway, Penn State-Dickinson Law (Howard University School of Law) 
Danielle Holley Walker, Howard (Harvard Law School) 
Renée McDonald Hutchins, University of the District of Columbia (Yale Law School) 
Verna Williams, University of Cincinnati (Harvard Law School) 
Camille A. Nelson, Hawaii (LLM Columbia Law School)  
Joan R.M. Bullock, Texas Southern University Thurgood Marshall School of Law (University of 
Toledo College of Law) 
Felicia Epps, University of North Texas—Dallas (Creighton University School of Law) 
Carla Pratt, Washburn University (Howard University School of Law)  
Patricia Bennett, Mississippi College School of Law (Mississippi College School of Law) 
Dayna Matthew, George Washington (University of Virginia School of Law) 
Eboni Nelson, University of Connecticut (Harvard Law School)  
Browne Lewis, North Carolina Central (University of Minnesota School of Law) 
Sean Scott, California Western Law (New York University School of Law) 
Camille Davidson, Southern Illinois (Georgetown University Law Center) 
Karen Bravo, University of Indiana-Indianapolis (Columbia University School of Law) 
Deidré A. Keller, FAMU (Emory University School of Law) 
Cassandra Hill, Northern Illinois (Howard University School of Law) 
Latonia Haney Keith, Interim Dean, Concordia University School of Law (Harvard Law School) 
This list was obtained from Dean Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Associate Dean Catherine Smith 
via e-mail transmission on 7/31/2020.  
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hierarchical notions of quality and excellence. As its mirror, 
representation can neither stand as a sole challenge to imbedded white 
supremacist and patriarchal practices in professional education, nor as a 
proxy for the substantive changes needed in professional school curricula 
to advance the cause of justice.  
In sum, the time for performative DEI measures has come to an end. 
Law schools must move beyond the superficial to examine how they 
perpetuate inequities in the core curriculum. They must enact critical 
interventions that underscore the simple truth - Black. Lives. Matter. 
Without these steps and more, legal education will continue to challenge 
the fundamental humanity of Black people and question the value of 
Black lives.  
